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A Special Case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed

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  • Ines Lindner

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-007-9076-9
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 64 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (June)
Pages: 495-518

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:64:y:2008:i:4:p:495-518

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

Related research

Keywords: limit theorems; ternary voting games; voting power; weighted voting games; C 71; D71;

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References

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  1. Felsenthal, Dan S & Machover, Moshe, 1996. " Alternative Forms of the Shapley Value and the Shapley-Shubik Index," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(3-4), pages 315-18, June.
  2. Paulo P. Corte-Real & Paulo Trigo Pereira, 2002. "The voter who wasn't there: Referenda, Representation and Abstention," Working Papers Department of Economics 2002/04, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
  3. MoshÊ Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 1997. "Ternary Voting Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 335-351.
  4. Straffin, Philip Jr., 1994. "Power and stability in politics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 32, pages 1127-1151 Elsevier.
  5. Lindner, Ines & Machover, Moshe, 2004. "L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 37-49, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Kóczy Á., László & Pintér, Miklós, 2011. "Az ellenzék ereje - általánosított súlyozott szavazási játékok
    [Minority power - generalized weighted voting games]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 543-551.
  2. László Á. Kóczy & Miklós Pintér, 2011. "The men who weren't even there: Legislative voting with absentees," Working Paper Series 1104, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  3. Sreejith Das, 2011. "Criticality in games with multiple levels of approval," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 373-395, September.

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