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Preferences, actions and voting rules

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Author Info

  • Alaitz Artabe
  • Annick Laruelle

    ()

  • Federico Valenciano

    ()

Abstract

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up - which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for manipulability (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Spanish Economic Association in its journal SERIEs.

Volume (Year): 3 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 15-28

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Handle: RePEc:spr:series:v:3:y:2012:i:1:p:15-28

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Related research

Keywords: Voting; Abstention; Absent voter; C71; D71;

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References

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  1. Laruelle,Annick & Valenciano,Federico, 2008. "Voting and Collective Decision-Making," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521873871.
  2. Helios Herrera & Andrea Mattozzi, 2010. "Quorum and Turnout in Referenda," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 8(4), pages 838-871, 06.
  3. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Quaternary dichotomous voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 431-454, March.
  4. Tchantcho, Bertrand & Lambo, Lawrence Diffo & Pongou, Roland & Engoulou, Bertrand Mbama, 2008. "Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 335-350, September.
  5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  6. Paulo P. Corte-Real & Paulo Trigo Pereira, 2002. "The voter who wasn't there: Referenda, Representation and Abstention," Working Papers Department of Economics, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon 2002/04, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
  7. Francois Maniquet & Massimo Morelli, 2010. "Approval Quorums Dominate Participation Quorums," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute ECO2010/13, European University Institute.
  8. Valenciano Llovera, Federico & Laruelle, Annick, 2010. "Majorities with a quorum," IKERLANAK, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I 2010-42, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  9. Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Diffo Lambo, Lawrence, 2008. "Political Influence in Multi-Choice Institutions: Cyclicity, Anonymity and Transitivity," MPRA Paper 18240, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 2009.
  10. MoshÊ Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 1997. "Ternary Voting Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 335-351.
  11. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle & Ricardo Martínez, 2004. "Success Versus Decisiveness: Conceptual Discussion And Case Study," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2004-30, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  12. Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2010. "The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , , vol. 22(1), pages 85-122, January.
  13. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
  14. Josep Freixas & William S. Zwicker, 2003. "Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 399-431, December.
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