Majorities with a quorum
AbstractBased on a general model of "quaternary" voting rule, sensitive to voters' choices between four different options (abstaining, voting "yes", voting "no" and staying home), we systematically study different types of majority and quorum. The model allows for a precise formulation of majority rules and quorum constraints. For such rules four types of majority can be defined. We also consider four types of quorum. Then we study the possible combinations of a majority system with a type of quorum and provide examples from rules actually used in parliaments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I in its series IKERLANAK with number 2010-42.
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-04-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2010-04-17 (Positive Political Economics)
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