The voter who wasn't there: Referenda, Representation and Abstention
AbstractWe analyze single binary-choice voting rules and identify the presence of the No-show paradox in this simple setting, as a consequence of specific turnout or quorum conditions that are included in actual rules. Since these conditions are meant to ensure a representative outcome, we try to formalize this concern and reach our main result: no voting rule can ensure representation if abstention is possible, unless specific restrictive assumptions are made on the preference domain of abstainers. We then focus on the main referendum systems and show that appropriate restrictions do make them compatible with representation. The main purpose of our paper is, however, to provide a tool for referendum design. Unawareness of the fact that defining a representative voting system necessarily entails restrictions on the preference domain of non-voters may lead to the imposition of restrictions that do not satisfy any deliberate criteria and generate such problems as the No-show paradox. We therefore recommend instead that a conscious choice be made on how abstention is to be interpreted and that this choice be used as a tool to derive the corresponding referendum rule.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon in its series Working Papers Department of Economics with number 2002/04.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, University of Lisbon, Rua do Quelhas 6, 1200-781 LISBON, PORTUGAL
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Other versions of this item:
- Paulo P. Côrte-Real & Paulo T. Pereira, 2004. "The voter who wasn’t there: Referenda, representation and abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 349-369, 04.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-11-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2002-11-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2002-11-10 (Positive Political Economics)
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