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Preferences, actions and voting rules

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Listed:
  • Artabe Echevarria, Alaitz
  • Laruelle, Annick
  • Valenciano Llovera, Federico

Abstract

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up - which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for manipulability (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

Suggested Citation

  • Artabe Echevarria, Alaitz & Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2011. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehu:ikerla:6259
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
    2. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2011. "Majorities with a quorum," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 241-259, April.
      • Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2010. "Majorities with a quorum," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    3. Helios Herrera & Andrea Mattozzi, 2010. "Quorum and Turnout in Referenda," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(4), pages 838-871, June.
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    5. Tchantcho, Bertrand & Lambo, Lawrence Diffo & Pongou, Roland & Engoulou, Bertrand Mbama, 2008. "Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 335-350, September.
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    8. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle & Ricardo Martínez, 2004. "Success Versus Decisiveness: Conceptual Discussion And Case Study," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-30, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    9. Annick Laruelle & Ricardo Martınez & Federico Valenciano, 2006. "Success Versus Decisiveness," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 185-205, April.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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