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Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003

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Author Info
Dan S Felsenthal ()
Moshé Machover ()

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Abstract

We analyse and evaluate the qualified majority (QM) decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU that are included in the Draft Constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention [5]. We use a method similar to the one we used in [9] for the QM prescriptions made in the Treaty of Nice. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-004-0317-3
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 23 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (08)
Pages: 1-20
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:23:y:2004:i:1:p:1-20

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  1. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations," Discussion Papers 999, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén, 2008. "Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room in Explaining EU Budget Receipts?," Discussion Papers 38, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén, 2008. "Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room Explaining EU Bydget Receipts?," Discussion Papers 1161, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "Voting Rules and Budget Allocation in an Enlarged EU," Discussion Papers 2, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Mika Widgrén, 2008. "The Impact of Council's Internal Decision-Making Rules on the Future EU," Discussion Papers 26, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Mika Widgrén, 2008. "The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making," Discussion Papers 1162, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
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