The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council
AbstractThe United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks – election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. Involvement in warfare lowers election probability, but there is little evidence that the level of economic development or foreign aid predict election.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University in its series CEDI Discussion Paper Series with number 12-09.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2012
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Other versions of this item:
- Axel Dreher & Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen & James Raymond Vreeland, 2012. "The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council," CESifo Working Paper Series 3902, CESifo Group Munich.
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- F55 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
- O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-09-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2012-09-22 (Discrete Choice Models)
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