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The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council

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  • Axel Dreher
  • Matthew Gould
  • Matthew Rablen
  • James Raymond Vreeland

Abstract

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks – election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. Involvement in warfare lowers election probability, but there is little evidence that the level of economic development or foreign aid predict election.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3902.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3902

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Keywords: United Nations; Security Council; turn-taking norm; elections;

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  18. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 742-757, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2013. "Politics and IMF Conditionality," CESifo Working Paper Series 4308, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Axel Dreher & Vera Eichenauer & Kai Gehring, 2013. "Geopolitics, Aid and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 4299, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Maya Schmaljohann, 2013. "The Allocation of German Aid: Self-interest and Government Ideology," Kiel Working Papers 1817, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  4. Toke, A.S. & Albornoz, F. & Gassebner, M., 2012. "The Golden Hello and Political Transitions," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 1241, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  5. Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen, 2013. "Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application," CESifo Working Paper Series 4519, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2014. "Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency," CEDI Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University 14-01, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
  7. Julian Donaubauer & Birgit Meyer & Peter Nunnenkamp, 2014. "Aid, Infrastructure, and FDI: Assessing the Transmission Channel with a New Index of Infrastructure," Kiel Working Papers 1954, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  8. Fabian Barthel & Eric Neumayer & Peter Nunnenkamp & Pablo Selaya, 2013. "Competition for Export Markets and the Allocation of Foreign Aid: The Role of Spatial Dependence among Donor Countries," Kiel Working Papers 1875, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  9. Gustavo Javier Canavire-Bacarreza & Eric Neumayer & Peter Nunnenkamp, 2014. "Why Aid is Unpredictable: An Empirical Analysis of the Gap between Actual and Planned Aid Flows," Kiel Working Papers 1933, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

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