The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership
AbstractNations elected to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as temporary members have lower levels of economic growth, become less democratic, and experience more restrictions on press freedoms than comparable nations not elected to the UNSC. Using regression and matching techniques the authors show, for instance, that over the two-year period of UNSC membership and the following two years during which a nation is ineligible for reelection, UNSC nations experience a 3.5 percent contraction in their economy relative to nations not elected to the UNSC. The detrimental effects of UNSC membership are strongest in nondemocratic nations. The authors contrast these results with the growing evidence that nations elected to the UNSC receive greater development assistance.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Peace Science Society (International) in its journal Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Volume (Year): 54 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
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Web page: http://pss.la.psu.edu/
International Organizations; United Nations Security Council; economic growth; foreign aid;
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- Axel Dreher & Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen & James Raymond Vreeland, 2012.
"The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council,"
CEDI Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University
12-09, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
- Axel Dreher & Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen & James Vreeland, 2014. "The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 51-83, January.
- Axel Dreher & Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen & James Raymond Vreeland, 2012. "The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council," CESifo Working Paper Series 3902, CESifo Group Munich.
- Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Maya Schmaljohann, 2013. "The Allocation of German Aid: Self-interest and Government Ideology," Kiel Working Papers 1817, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Madeleine Hosli & Rebecca Moody & Bryan O’Donovan & Serguei Kaniovski & Anna Little, 2011. "Squaring the circle? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 163-187, July.
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