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Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?

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Abstract

Using panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich in its series KOF Working papers with number 06-137.

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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kof:wpskof:06-137

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Keywords: IMF; World Bank; UN General Assembly; Voting; Aid;

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