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IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence

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Abstract

This article analyzes whether and to what extent reliance on conditionality is appropriate to guarantee the revolving character of Fund resources. The paper presents theoretical arguments in favour of conditionality, and those against the use of conditions. It summarizes the track record of program implementation and discusses the evidence of factors determining implementation. Whether proponents or critics of conditionality can be supported by existing data analysis is also investigated, as is the success of conditionality in terms of outcomes. The final section draws policy implications.

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Paper provided by KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich in its series KOF Working papers with number 08-188.

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Length: 56 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kof:wpskof:08-188

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Keywords: IMF; conditionality; compliance; implementation;

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