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Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF conditionality?

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Abstract

We investigate whether elected members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), analyzing panel data on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the period of 1992 to 2008. We find a negative relationship. Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions attached to the loans that they receive from the IMF. We conclude that conditionality is softer for these countries because the major shareholders of the IMF desire influence over the Security Council.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich in its series KOF Working papers with number 10-262.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kof:wpskof:10-262

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Keywords: IMF; UN Security Council; Voting; Aid; Conditionality;

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  1. World Bank, 2008. "World Development Indicators 2008," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 11855, August.
  2. Dreher, Axel, 2005. "IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 11, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
  3. Jan-Egbert Sturm & Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan, 2005. "Which Variables Explain Decisions On Imf Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 177-213, 07.
  4. James Vreeland, 2006. "IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 359-378, December.
  5. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2005. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," KOF Working papers, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich 05-118, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  6. Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2003. "The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality," International Finance, EconWPA 0309004, EconWPA, revised 17 Oct 2003.
  7. Robert J Barro & Jong-Wha Lee, 2003. "IMF Programs: Who Is Chosen and What Are the Effects?," Departmental Working Papers, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics 2003-09, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics.
  8. Axel Dreher, 2008. "IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence," KOF Working papers, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich 08-188, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  9. Axel Dreher, 2004. "A Public Choice Perspective of IMF and World Bank Lending and Conditionality," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 445-464, 06.
  10. Beck, T.H.L. & Clarke, G. & Groff, A. & Keefer , P. & Walsh, P., 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125517, Tilburg University.
  11. Alex Mourmouras & Anna Ivanova & George C. Anayotos & Wolfgang Mayer, 2003. "What Determines the Implementation of IMF-Supported Programs?," IMF Working Papers 03/8, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Ruben Atoyan & Patrick Conway, 2006. "Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A comparison of matching and instrumental-variable estimators," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 99-124, June.
  13. Graham Bird, 2001. "IMF Programmes: Is there a conditionality Laffer Curve?," World Economics, World Economics, Economic & Financial Publishing, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, World Economics, Economic & Financial Publishing, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 2(2), pages 29-49, April.
  14. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 742-757, October.
  15. Christopher Kilby, 2006. "Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 173-195, June.
  16. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521816755 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
  18. Gould, Erica R., 2003. "Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(03), pages 551-586, June.
  19. Przeworski, Adam & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2000. "The effect of IMF programs on economic growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 385-421, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani & Axel Dreher, 2009. "Read my lips: the role of information transmission in multilateral reform design," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 4, Courant Research Centre PEG.
  2. Dreher, Axel & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2011. "Buying votes and international organizations," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 123, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.

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