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Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF decisions? Evidence from panel data

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Author Info
Dreher, Axel
Sturm, Jan-Egbert
Vreeland, James Raymond

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Abstract

We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using panel data for 191 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects, and duration dependence. There is also evidence that UNSC membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership.

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Paper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics in its series Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 with number 4.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:gdec07:6527

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Related research
Keywords: IMF; UN Security Council; Voting; Aid;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

References listed on IDEAS
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  3. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2006. "Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Robert Trudel, 2005. "Effects of Exchange Rate Regime on IMF Program Participation," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 22(6), pages 919-936, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Bird, Graham & Hussain, Mumtaz & Joyce, Joseph P., 2004. "Many happy returns? Recidivism and the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 231-251, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2004. "Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Donald P. Green & Soo Yeon Kim & David H. Yoon, 2001. "Dirty Pool," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 55(2), pages 441-468, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Kilby, Christopher, 2005. "Donor Influence in MDBs: the Case of the Asian Development Bank," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 70, Vassar College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  27. Michele Fratianni & John Pattison, 2004. "Who is Running the IMF: Critical Shareholders or the Staff?," Working Papers 2004-06, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
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  28. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2005. "IMF Quotas; Constructing An International Organization Using Inferior Building Blocks," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 1305, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
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  32. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
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  33. Axel Dreher, 2004. "A Public Choice Perspective of IMF and World Bank Lending and Conditionality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 445-464, 06. [Downloadable!]
  34. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1126-1137, September. [Downloadable!]
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  35. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani & Axel Dreher, 2009. "Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence," KOF Working papers 09-218, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Axel Dreher & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers," KOF Working papers 08-193, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Thiele, Rainer & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Dreher, Axel, 2007. "Do Donors Target Aid in Line with the Millennium Development Goals? A Sector Perspective of Aid Allocation," Working Papers UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Axel Dreher & Silvia Marchesi & James Vreeland, 2008. "The political economy of IMF forecasts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 145-171, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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