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Do Human Rights Offenders Oppose Human Rights Resolutions in the United Nations?

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Author Info
Axel Dreher () (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich Switzerland and CESifo, Germany)
Bernhard Boockmann () (Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim)

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Abstract

We investigate voting behavior on human rights in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Our central question is whether countries with a low human rights record systematically oppose human rights resolutions. An instrumental account of voting would suggest that these countries aim to weaken UN human rights resolutions since they could be future targets of these policies. If reputation aspects and other non-instrumental motives dominate, the influence can go in either direction. We estimate determinants of voting on the basis of 13,000 individual voting decisions from 1980 to 2002. Our results from ordered probit estimation show that a country’s human rights situation is irrelevant to voting behavior if regional dependence of voting is controlled for. This suggests that countries’ voting decisions are not made independently from each other. The results also show that simple rules for aggregating voting choices can lead to misleading results.

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Paper provided by KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich in its series Working papers with number 07-163.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
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Handle: RePEc:kof:wpskof:07-163

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Related research
Keywords: Voting; Human Rights; United Nations; Instrumental Voting;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation

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    Other versions:
  3. Levitt, Steven D, 1996. "How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senate Ideology," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 425-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2006. "Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck & Harr, Thomas & Tarp, Finn, 2006. "On US politics and IMF lending," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(7), pages 1843-1862, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
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  18. Voeten, Erik, 2000. "Clashes in the Assembly," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 54(2), pages 185-215, Spring.
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