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Buying Votes and International Organizations

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  • Axel Dreher

    (Heidelberg University)

  • James Raymond Vreeland

    (Georgetown University)

Abstract

This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Analyzing an original dataset on the successful and failed resolutions of the UNSC, we find evidence of vote-buying.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Courant Research Centre PEG in its series Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers with number 78.

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Date of creation: 10 May 2011
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Handle: RePEc:got:gotcrc:078

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Keywords: IMF; UN Security Council; Voting; Aid;

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References

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  1. Thomas Barnebeck Andersen & Henrik Hansen & Thomas Markussen, 2004. "US Politics and World Bank IDA-Lending," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 05-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised May 2005.
  2. J. Broz, 2011. "The United States Congress and IMF financing, 1944–2009," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 341-368, September.
  3. A. Colin Cameron & Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, 2006. "Robust Inference with Multi-way Clustering," NBER Technical Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 0327, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Dreher, Axel, 2006. "IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 769-788, May.
  5. Roland Vaubel, 1986. "A public choice approach to international organization," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 39-57, January.
  6. Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob, 2004. "Which variables explain decisions on IMF credit? An extreme bounds analysis," Discussion Papers 2004/15, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  7. J. Broz, 2008. "Congressional voting on funding the international financial institutions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 351-374, December.
  8. Christoph Moser & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2011. "Explaining IMF Lending Decisions after the Cold War," KOF Working papers, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich 11-279, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  9. Faini, Riccardo & Grilli, Enzo, 2004. "Who Runs the IFIs?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4666, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Michele FRATIANNI & John PATTISON, 2007. "Who Is Runninc the IMF: Critical Shareholders or the Staff?," Working Papers, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali 279, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
  11. Kilby, Christopher, 2009. "The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 51-61, May.
  12. Harrigan, Jane & Wang, Chengang & El-Said, Hamed, 2006. "The economic and political determinants of IMF and world bank lending in the Middle East and North Africa," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 247-270, February.
  13. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2003. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," International Finance, EconWPA 0310004, EconWPA, revised 08 Jan 2004.
  14. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2007. "Development Aid and International Politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?," KOF Working papers, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich 07-171, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  15. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521816755 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 905-930, October.
  17. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2010. "Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF conditionality?," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers, Courant Research Centre PEG 36, Courant Research Centre PEG.
  18. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 742-757, October.
  19. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2006. "Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?," KOF Working papers, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich 06-137, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  20. Martin Steinwand & Randall Stone, 2008. "The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 123-149, June.
  21. Ai, Chunrong & Norton, Edward C., 2003. "Interaction terms in logit and probit models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-129, July.
  22. Christopher Kilby, 2010. "Informal influence in the Asian Development Bank," Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics 13, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics.
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Cited by:
  1. Michel Le Breton & Peter Sudhölter & Vera Zaporozhets, 2012. "Sequential legislative lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 491-520, July.
  2. Le Breton, Michel & Sudhölter, Peter & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Sequential Legislative Lobbying," LERNA Working Papers, LERNA, University of Toulouse 12.19.376, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

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