Which Variables Explain Decisions On Imf Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis
AbstractThis paper analyses which economic and political factors affect the chance that a country receives IMF credit or signs an agreement with the Fund. We use a panel model for 118 countries over the period 1971-2000. Our results, based on extreme bounds analysis, suggest that it is mostly economic variables that are robustly related to IMF lending activity, while most political variables that have been put forward in previous studies on IMF involvement are non-significant. To the extent that political factors matter, they seem more closely related to the conclusion of IMF agreements than to the disbursement of IMF credits. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics & Politics.
Volume (Year): 17 (2005)
Issue (Month): (07)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985
Other versions of this item:
- Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob, 2004. "Which variables explain decisions on IMF credit? An extreme bounds analysis," Discussion Papers 2004/15, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2005. "Which Variables Explain Decisions on IMF Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis ," TWI Research Paper Series 13, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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