Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Dennis Leech

Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 113 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
Pages: 437-64
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:113:y:2002:i:3-4:p:437-64

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research

Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Leech, Dennis & Aziz, Haris, 2007. "The Double Majority Voting Rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a Democratic Ideal for an Enlarging Union : an Appraisal Using Voting Power Analysis," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 824, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. F. Barthélémy & M. Martin, 2005. "Répartition des sièges au sein des structures intercommunales du Val d’Oise," THEMA Working Papers 2005-16, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
3. Yener Kandogan, 2003. "DEMOCRACY’S SPREAD: Elections and Sovereign Debt in Developing Countries," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-576, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
4. Plechanovová, Bela, 2003. "The Treaty of Nice and the Distribution of Votes in the Council – Voting Power Consequences for the EU after the Oncoming Enlargement," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 7, 05. [Downloadable!]
5. Napel,S. & Widgren,M., 2002. "Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach," Working papers 345, University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Mika Widgren, 2003. "Enlargements and the Principles of Designing EU -- Decision-Making Procedures," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
7. Fabrice Barthélémy & Mathieu MARTIN, 2007. "A comparison between the methods of apportionment using power indices: the case of the U.S. presidential election," THEMA Working Papers 2007-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
8. Yener Kandogan, 2005. "Power analysis of the Nice Treaty on the future of European integration," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 37(10), pages 1147-1156, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Mika Widgren, 2003. "Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules," European Economy Group Working Papers 23, European Economy Group. [Downloadable!]
10. Barbera, Salvador & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," Working Papers 1196, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," Working Papers 2004.76, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    • Salvador BARBER?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es & Matthew O. JACKSON, 2003. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogenous Union," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 597.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    • Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2006. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 317-339, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Fabrice Barthélémy & Mathieu Martin, 2007. "Configurations study for the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices of power," THEMA Working Papers 2007-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
12. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgrén, Mika, 2005. "Voting Rules and Budget Allocation in an Enlarged EU," CEPR Discussion Papers 5134, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "Voting Rules and Budget Allocation in an Enlarged EU," Discussion Papers 2, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
13. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2004. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Stefan Napel & Mika Widgren, 2004. "The Inter-institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Discussion Papers 944, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
    • Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to use our services.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-30.