The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision
AbstractThis paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act strategically. Predicted bargaining outcomes of the crucial Conciliation stage of codecision are shown to be strongly biased towards the legislative status quo. Making symmetric preference assumptions for members of CM and EP, CM is on average much more conservative because of its internal qualified majority rule. This makes CM by an order of magnitude more influential than EP, in contrast to a seeming formal parity between the two ‘co-legislators’.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1347.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
power measurement; European Union codecision procedure; bargaining; spatial voting; decision procedures;
Other versions of this item:
- Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
- Napel, Stefan & Widgren, Mika, 2004. "The Inter-institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Discussion Papers, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy 944, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-12-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2004-12-12 (European Economics)
- NEP-EEC-2004-12-27 (European Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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ULB Institutional Repository
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