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The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision

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  • Stefan Napel
  • Mika Widgrén

Abstract

This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act strategically. Predicted bargaining outcomes of the crucial Conciliation stage of codecision are shown to be strongly biased towards the legislative status quo. Making symmetric preference assumptions for members of CM and EP, CM is on average much more conservative because of its internal qualified majority rule. This makes CM by an order of magnitude more influential than EP, in contrast to a seeming formal parity between the two ‘co-legislators’.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1347.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1347

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Keywords: power measurement; European Union codecision procedure; bargaining; spatial voting; decision procedures;

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  1. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2003. "Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the EU's Conciliation Committee," CESifo Working Paper Series 1029, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Leech, Dennis, 2002. " Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-64, December.
  3. Algaba, E. & Bilbao, J. M. & Fernandez Garcia, J. R. & Lopez, J. J., 2003. "Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 63-80, August.
  4. Napel,S. & Widgren,M., 2002. "Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach," Working Papers 345, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  5. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Bindseil, Ulrich & Hantke, Cordula, 1997. "The power distribution in decision making among EU member states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 171-185, February.
  7. Annick Laruelle & Mika Widgrén, 1998. "Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 317-339, March.
  8. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
  9. Segendorff, Bjorn, 1998. "Delegation and Threat in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 266-283, May.
  10. Jason Barr & Francesco Passarelli, . "Who Has the Power in the EU?," Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark, Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark 2004-005, Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark.
  11. Abdul Ghafar Noury & Gérard Roland, 2002. "More power to the European Parliament?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7760, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  12. Dan S Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-20, 08.
  13. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  14. Baldwin, Richard & Widgrén, Mika, 2004. "Winners and Losers Under Various Dual Majority Rules for the EU Council of Ministers," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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