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Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners’ Nationality and Budget Allocation in the European Union

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  • Gehring, Kai
  • Schneider, Stephan A.

Abstract

We analyse whether there is a relationship between EU Commissioners’ national origin and political outcomes. For this purpose, we argue that examining the Commissioner for Agriculture allows the most precise empirical identification: there is a specific budget for agriculture which accounts for the largest share of the overall EU budget and gives significant leeway to the Commissioner. On average, providing the Commissioners is associated with increases in the share of the overall EU budget that is allocated to their country of origin of about one percentage point. This increase corresponds to half a billion Euro per year, a significant change in particular for smaller member states. Alternative explanations are considered using country-specific time trends, examining pre- and post-treatment trends and modeling endogenous treatment-selection. There are no significant differences in trend behavior between treated and non-treated countries both before and after providing the Commissioner. We demonstrate that our results are not driven by individual countries and show that selection-on-unobservables would have to be implausibly high to account for the estimated coefficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Gehring, Kai & Schneider, Stephan A., 2015. "Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners’ Nationality and Budget Allocation in the European Union," Working Papers 0596, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:awi:wpaper:0596
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    Cited by:

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    3. Nathalie Ferrière, 2022. "To Give or Not to Give? How Do Other Donors React to European Food Aid Allocation?," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 34(1), pages 147-171, February.
    4. Harry Pickard, 2021. "The Impact of Career Politicians: Evidence from US Governors," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 103-125, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal Federalism; Political Economy; Budget Allocation; European Union; EU Commission; EU Commissioners; National Origin;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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