Distributive politics and intergovernmental transfers: The local allocation of European Union structural funds
AbstractThe European Union budget is distributed primarily in the form of intergovernmental grants to sub-state governments, which invest the grants in local projects. Transfers are allocated under the auspices of the European structural funds. This article assesses the causal links between electoral incentives on the recipient side, European funding goals, and local grant allocation. Tobit regressions of the allocation patterns in 419 local districts in Germany for the period 2000â€“6 suggest the following: although recipient sub-state governments enjoy substantial discretion in selecting projects, their distributive choices are largely in accord with European goals. As theoretically predicted, however, there is robust evidence that sub-state governmentsâ€™ electoral concerns distort the local allocation of structural funds.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal European Union Politics.
Volume (Year): 13 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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- Jenny Simon & Justin Mattias Valasek, 2013. "Centralized Fiscal Spending by Supranational Unions," CESifo Working Paper Series 4321, CESifo Group Munich.
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