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From Rome to Lisbon and Beyond: Member States' Power, Efficiency, and Proportionality in the EU Council of Ministers

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Listed:
  • Nikolaos Antonakakis

    (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business; Department of Economics and Finance, University of Portsmouth)

  • Harald Badinger

    (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business; Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO))

  • Wolf Heinrich Reuter

    (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business)

Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the evolution of EU member states' power, the EU's capability to act (efficiency), and the proportionality of the voting system in the Council of Ministers from the treaties of Rome in 1958 till the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and beyond, using a wide range of alternative power indices. Moreover, it considers explicitly the relevance of additional legal provisions (such as the 'Luxembourg Compromise', the 'Demographic Clause', and the 'Ioannina Compromise') and the implications of novel, more recently introduced voting rules such as reverse qualified majority voting.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikolaos Antonakakis & Harald Badinger & Wolf Heinrich Reuter, 2014. "From Rome to Lisbon and Beyond: Member States' Power, Efficiency, and Proportionality in the EU Council of Ministers," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp175, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp175
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 159-173.
    2. André Sapir & Jean Pisani-Ferry & Guntram Wolff, 2012. "The Messy Rebuilding of Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/174289, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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    5. Mika Widgrén, 2009. "The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making -super-1," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 55(1), pages 30-56, March.
    6. Bilbao, J. M. & Fernandez, J. R. & Jimenez, N. & Lopez, J. J., 2002. "Voting power in the European Union enlargement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 181-196, November.
    7. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgren, Mika, 2007. "Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 693-706, September.
    8. Geoffrey Garrett & George Tsebelis, 1999. "Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 291-308, July.
    9. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
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    12. Thomas K÷nig & Thomas Brõuninger, 2000. "Decisiveness and Inclusiveness: Two Aspects of the Intergovernmental Choices of European Voting Rule," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 17, pages 107-123.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dmitry Kreptsev & Sergei Seleznev, 2017. "DSGE Model of the Russian Economy with the Banking Sector," Bank of Russia Working Paper Series wps27, Bank of Russia.
    2. Fritz Breuss, 2013. "Die Größe der Kleinen in der EU," WIFO Working Papers 452, WIFO.
    3. Luca Alfieri & Nino Kokashvili, 2020. "Financial Safety Nets In East Asia And Europe: A Political Economy Assessment," University of Tartu - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Working Paper Series 121, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Tartu (Estonia).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Council; Enlargement; Efficiency; EU; Member States; Power Index;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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