The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations
AbstractThe paper analyses the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the EU's Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament than the Council. A data set covering 66 dossiers with 162 controversial EU legislative proposals passed between 1999 and 2002 is investigated to test this. In fact, the Council is significantly more conservative than Parliament and Commission; the latter two are significantly closer to each other than Council and Commission.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 137 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
European Commission; Investiture procedure; Voting rules; Council of Ministers; European Parliament; C70; D71; H77;
Other versions of this item:
- Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2007. "The European Commission – Appointment, Preferences, and Institutional Relations," CESifo Working Paper Series 2120, CESifo Group Munich.
- Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The European Commission – Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations," Discussion Papers 6, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Napel, Stefan & Widgrén, Mika, 2006. "The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations," Discussion Papers 999, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Napel, Stefan & Widgrén, Mika, 2006. "The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 5478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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