Power distribution in the Weimar Reichstag in 1919–1933
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-013-1325-4
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Cited by:
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- Guillermo Owen & Francesc Carreras, 2022. "Spatial games and endogenous coalition formation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 1095-1115, November.
- Kamionko, V. & Marakulin, V., 2020. "Shapley's value and its axiomatization in games with prior probabilities of coalition formation," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 12-29.
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Keywords
Power distribution; Preferences; Reichstag; Weimar Republic;All these keywords.
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