Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility
AbstractA spatial model of coalition formation is used together with data from Dutch elections and theoretical instances to study different procedures of coalition formation. The model shows that procedure plays an important role in reaching a coalition agreement and that political parties do not necessarily benefit from being a first-mover. Moreover, it is shown that a decrease in a party's flexibility can be (dis)advantageous in coalition negotiations. Furthermore, certain power sharing tactics appear not always to lead to an agreement that is in a party's advantage. The main message put forward is that the procedure of forming a coalition plays a more important role than is usually acknowledged in literature and practice.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number hal-00666849.
Date of creation: May 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Group Decision and Negotiation, 2013, 22, 3, 407-427
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Coalition formation ; Elections ; Maneuvering space ; Step-by-step procedure ; Simultaneous procedure ; Minimal winning coalition;
Other versions of this item:
- Annelies De Ridder & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Elena Saiz & Eligius M.T. Hendrix, 2008. "Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility," Post-Print halshs-00269093, HAL.
- Annelies de Ridder & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Elena Saiz & Eligius K.M. Hendrix, 2008. "Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility," Working Papers 0806, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-02-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2012-02-20 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
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