Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility
AbstractIn this paper, we analyze a spatial model of coalition formation with data from Dutch elections and with theoretical results. First, we study different procedures of coalition formation. The model shows that procedure plays an important role in reaching a coalition agreement and that political parties do not necessarily benefit from being a firstmover. Moreover, it is shown that a decrease in a party’s flexibility can be beneficial in coalition negotiations. Furthermore, we find that certain power sharing tactics do not always lead to an agreement that is in a party’s advantage. The main message put forward is that the process of coalition formation plays a more important role than is usually acknowledged in literature and practice.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure in its series Working Papers with number 0806.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
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coalition formation; elections; simultaneous procedure; step-by-step procedure;
Other versions of this item:
- Eligius Hendrix & Annelies De Ridder & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Elena Saiz, 2013. "Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00666849, HAL.
- Annelies De Ridder & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Elena Saiz & Eligius M.T. Hendrix, 2008. "Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility," Post-Print halshs-00269093, HAL.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-06-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-06-07 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2008-06-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2008-06-07 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Arnold, Tone & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2002. "Dynamic coalition formation and the core," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 363-380, November.
- Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D.Marc Kilgour, 2003.
"Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters,"
2003.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Annelies De Ridder & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2008.
"On Some Procedures of Forming a Multi-partner Alliance,"
- Annelies de Ridder & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2008. "On Some Procedures of Forming a Multipartner Alliance," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(2), pages 443-487, 06.
- Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
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