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Political Parties And Coalition Formation

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  • Dhillon, Amrita

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick,)

Abstract

This chapter gives a flavour of recent theoretical work on coalition formation and political parties. I survey recent work on both pre-election coalition formation and post election coalition (or government) formation. A number of alternative rationales for the formation of parties are compared with the help of some illustrative examples.

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File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp697.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 697.

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Length: 60 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:697

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Related research

Keywords: Political Parties ; Coalition formation ; uni-dimensional ; multi-dimensional ; pre-electoral coalitions ; legislative coalitions;

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References

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  1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 1998. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1036, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
  3. Martin J Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2010. "Party formation in collective decision-making," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000050, David K. Levine.
  4. Andrei Gomberg & Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño Ortín, 2003. "A Model Of Endogenous Political Party Platforms," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2003-12, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  5. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
  6. D Austen-Smith, 1983. "The spatial theory of electoral competition: instability, institutions, and information," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Pion Ltd, London, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 1(4), pages 439-459, August.
  7. Massimo Morelli, 2004. "Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71, pages 829-853, 07.
  8. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
  9. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Dhillon, Amrita & Rossetto, Silvia, 2009. "Corporate Control and Multiple Large Shareholders," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 891, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  2. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2004. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2004.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tomas Sjostrom, 2009. "Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics 200908, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  4. Daniel Ladley & James Rockey, 2010. "Party Formation and Competition," Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, University of Leicester 10/17, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.

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