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The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey

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  • Moser, Peter
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 15 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 1-33

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:1-33

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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    Cited by:
    1. Berggren, Niclas & Karlson, Nils, 2002. "Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs," Ratio Working Papers 3, The Ratio Institute.
    2. Mariano Tommasi, 2003. "Crises, institutions politiques et réformes politiques : le bon, le mauvais et l'affreux," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 17(2), pages 49-81.

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