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Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines

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  • Spiller, Pablo T
  • Spitzer, Matthew L

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 8 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 8-46

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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:1:p:8-46

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Cited by:
  1. Mario Bergara & Barak Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, 2002. "Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: Congressional Constraint," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1402, Department of Economics - dECON.
  2. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
  3. Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, 2007. "Strategic Judicial Decision Making," NBER Working Papers 13321, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Brian Goff, 2006. "Supreme Court consensus and dissent: Estimating the role of the selection screen," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 367-383, June.
  5. George Tridimas, 2010. "Constitutional judicial review and political insurance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 81-101, February.
  6. Michele Santoni & Francesco Zucchini, 2003. "Legislative output and the Costitutional Court in Italy," Departmental Working Papers 2003-19, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
  7. Brian Goff, 2005. "Supreme Court consensus and dissent: Estimating the role of the selection screen," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 483-499, March.
  8. De Figueiredo, John M. & De Figueiredo, Rui J. P. Jr., 2002. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation," Working papers 4247-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  9. Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller, 2004. "The Institutions of Regulation," Working Papers 67, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2004.
  10. John M. de Figueiredo & Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, 2002. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation," NBER Working Papers 8981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Mat McCubbins & Roger Noll & Barry Weingast, 2005. "The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies," Discussion Papers 04-035, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

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