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Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs

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Author Info
 Berggren, Niclas
Karlson, Nils

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Abstract

According to many democracy theorists, there is an unavoidable trade-off between constitutionalism and the need for political action. This paper criticizes that belief. Rather, it argues that a division of power, while sometimes entailing high political transaction costs, can nevertheless be beneficial and that it is not necessarily the case that a division of power does entail high transaction costs. The analysis expands the framework of Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Constitutionalism is thus defended against one of its main perceived deficiencies: its bringing about gridlock. This does not always happen, and when it does, it is often a good thing. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 117 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
Pages: 99-124
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:117:y:2003:i:1-2:p:99-124

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  1. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 243-50, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2001. "Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2872, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Matsusaka, John G, 2000. "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative in the First Half of the Twentieth Century," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 619-50, October.
  4. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
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  5. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Feld, Lars P & Savioz, Marcel R, 1997. "Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 507-38.
  7. Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct Democracy: Politico-economic Lessons from Swiss Experience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 338-42, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-53, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Buchanan, James M, 2001. "Direct Democracy, Classical Liberalism, and Constitutional Strategy," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(2-3), pages 235-42.
  10. W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Feld, Lars P. & Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Direct democracy, political culture, and the outcome of economic policy: a report on the Swiss experience," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 287-306, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Lars P. Feld & John G. Matsusaka, 2000. "Budget Referendums and Government Spending: Evidence from Swiss," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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