This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
William M. Landes
Richard A. Posner

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We believe that at a deeper level the independent judiciary is not only consistent with, but essential to, the interest-group theory of government. Part I of this paper explains our theory of the independent judiciary. Part II discusses several implications of the theory, relating to administrative regulation, the form of interest-group legislation, the tenure of judges, and constitutional adjudication. The appendix to this paper presents an empirical analysis of judicial independence using data on Acts of Congress that have been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w0110.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 0110.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Oct 1975
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective." Journal of Law and Economics, (December 1975).
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:0110

Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Ludwig van den Hauwe, 2005. "Public Choice, Constitutional Political Economy and Law and Economics," Law and Economics 0508006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Besley, Timothy J. & Payne, A. Abigail, 2005. "Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does Judicial Selection Matter?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5211, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Axel Dreher & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers," Working papers 08-193, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 1996. "Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan," Public Economics 9603001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 2001. "When are Judges and Bureaucrats Left Independent? Theory and History from Imperial Japan, Postwar Japan, and the United States," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-126, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  6. Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, 2007. "Legal Origins and the Evolution of Institutions: Evidence from American State Courts," Working Papers 320, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2007. [Downloadable!]
  7. Josh Lerner, 2000. "150 Years of Patent Office Practice," NBER Working Papers 7477, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Ludwig van den Hauwe, 2005. "Constitutional economics," Public Economics 0508010, EconWPA, revised 19 Aug 2005. [Downloadable!]
  9. F. Andrew Hanssen, 2004. "Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 712-729, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2004. "Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary+," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200429, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Jenny Monheim & Marie Obidzinski, 2007. "Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking," Working Papers of BETA 2007-31, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  12. Frank Cross, 2003. "Business and Judicial Politics," Business and Politics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1058-1058. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Berggren, Niclas & Karlson, Nils, 2002. "Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs," Ratio Working Papers 3, The Ratio Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Craig Nard & Andrew Morriss, 2007. "Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia," Review of Law & Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(2), pages 4. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Edward J. Lopez & Daniel Sutter, 2005. "Ignorance in Congressional Voting? Evidence from Policy Reversal on the Endangered Species Act," Microeconomics 0512002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Tim Besley & Abigail Payne, 2003. "Judicial accountability and economic policy outcomes: evidence from employment discrimination charges," IFS Working Papers W03/11, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  17. Paul H. Rubin & Mark A. Cohen, 1992. "Politically Imposed Entry Barriers," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 18(3), pages 333-344, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Mwangi S. Kimenyi & William F. Shughart II, 2008. "The Political Economy of Constitutional Choice: A Study of the 2005 Kenyan Constitutional Referendum," Working papers 2008-08, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. Stefan Voigt & Michael Ebeling & Lorenz Blume, 2004. "Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," Discussion Papers in Economics 67/04, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  20. Ludwig van den Hauwe, 2005. "Constitutional economics II," Public Economics 0508009, EconWPA, revised 19 Aug 2005. [Downloadable!]
  21. Edward J. Lopez & R. Todd Jewell, 2005. "Strategic Institutional Choice: Voters, States, and Congressional Term Limits," Public Economics 0512006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc stands for Research Papers in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.