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The political economy of supreme court constitutional decisions: The case of Roosevelt's court-packing plan

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Author Info
Gely, Rafael
Spiller, Pablo T.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V7M-45D0S1J-5/2/a860d361d69dc750e379a4d192faa156
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 12 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 45-67
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:12:y:1992:i:1:p:45-67

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  1. Michele Santoni & Francesco Zucchini, 2003. "Legislative output and the Costitutional Court in Italy," Departemental Working Papers 2003-19, Department of Economics University of Milan Italy. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Pablo T. Spiller & Sanny Liao, 2006. "Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups' Participation in Policy Making - A Selective Survey," NBER Working Papers 12209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Pablo Spiller & Richard Vanden Bergh, 2003. "Toward A Positive Theory of State Supreme Court Decision Making," Business and Politics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1061-1061. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Maurice Kugler & Howard Rosental, 2000. "Checks and Balances: an assessment of the institutional separtion of political powers in Colombia," WORKING PAPERS SERIES. DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 002117, FEDESARROLLO. [Downloadable!]
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