The political economy of supreme court constitutional decisions: The case of Roosevelt's court-packing plan
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 12 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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