The First Word and the Last Word in the Budgetary Process: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Proposal and Veto Authorities
AbstractThis study examines the role of proposal authority and executive veto in the budgetary process. A five-stage sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional actors--a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive--is presented. The authors examine (1) the factors that affect the executive's power in shaping the final budget when the executive is granted proposal authority; (2) how increased veto authority, in combination with executive proposal authority, affects the executive's power in forming the final budget; and (3) the effects of different types of proposal authority and veto rules on the efficiency of the budgetary process. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 81 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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- Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
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