Circumventing Formal Structure through Commitment: Presidential Influence and Agenda Control
AbstractAlthough the formal institutional structure that defines the temporal order of play in a policy game between the Congress and the president ought to provide Congress with agenda power, the president is traditionally treated as the dominant player in this relationship. The authors show that if the president can make "clear-cut" commitments, presidential commitment can counter the dominance heirarchy and the complexion of equilibrium outcomes. Thus, the details of political interactions (in particular, the possibilities for commitment) may be as important as the formal specification of institutional structure. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 70 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Groseclose, Timothy J. & McCarty, Nolan, 1999. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience," Research Papers 1617, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Nicholas Miller, 2012. "Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 1-25, January.
- Shyh-Fang Ueng, 1999. "The Virtue of Installing Veto Players," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 265-282, October.
- Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.