Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 150 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Electoral College; Social choice; Institutional analysis;
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- Ingberman, Daniel E & Yao, Dennis A, 1991. " Circumventing Formal Structure through Commitment: Presidential Influence and Agenda Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 151-79, May.
- Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Bafumi, Joseph, 2002. "Standard Voting Power Indexes Don't Work: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 1133, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Claus Beisbart & Luc Bovens, 2008. "A power measure analysis of Amendment 36 in Colorado," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 231-246, March.
- Leech, Dennis, 2010. "Power Indices in Large Voting Bodies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 942, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2004.
"On the rule of K names,"
264, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2004. "The probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type election," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 227-257, January.
- Patrick Hummel, 2011. "Proportional versus winner-take-all electoral vote allocations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 381-393, September.
- Van Wesep, Edward D., 2014. "The Idealized Electoral College voting mechanism and shareholder power," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 90-108.
- John Aldrich & Jason Reifler & Michael Munger, 2014. "Sophisticated and myopic? Citizen preferences for Electoral College reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 541-558, March.
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