Agent Discretion, Regulatory Policymaking, and Different Institutional Arrangements
AbstractThis paper examines agent discretion that is a result of the structure of the legislative process. Based on several distributions of lawmaking powers, different games are analyzed in which players decide on regulatory policies. The analysis shows that agent discretion increases as lawmaking powers are differentiated and assigned to specialized players. Particularly, monopoly initiation power, which allows a player to act as a gatekeeper, has a substantial impact on discretion. Agent discretion will be even larger when these players also have heterogeneous preferences. The framework that is developed in this paper permits comparisons across different political systems with regard to agent discretion and legislative control on policymaking. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 86 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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- Dieter Schmidtchen & Bernard Steunenberg, .
"European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue,"
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press
2002-1-1040, Berkeley Electronic Press.
- Schmidtchen, Dieter & Steunenberg, Bernard, 2002. "European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-13, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Steunenberg, Bernard & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2000. "The Comitology Game: European Policymaking with Parliamentary Involvement," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2000-05, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Michael Taylor & Marc Quintyn, 2002. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 02/46, International Monetary Fund.
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