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European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue

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Author Info
Dieter Schmidtchen (Universität des Saarlandes)
Bernard Steunenberg (Leiden University)
Abstract

In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion).

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Paper provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its series German Working Papers in Law and Economics with number 2002-1-1040.

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Handle: RePEc:bep:dewple:2002-1-1040

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  1. Garrett, Geoffrey, 1992. "International cooperation and institutional choice: the European Community's internal market," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(02), pages 533-560, March. [Downloadable!]
  2. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
  3. Breton, Albert & Wintrobe, Ronald, 1975. "The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(1), pages 195-207, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Spitzer, Matthew L, 1990. "Extensions of Ferejohn and Shipan's Model of Administrative Agency Behavior," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 29-43.
  5. Eskridge, William N, Jr & Ferejohn, John, 1992. "Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 165-89, March.
  6. Garrett, Geoffrey, 1992. "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 46(2), pages 533-60, Spring.
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