Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility
A spatial model of coalition formation is used together with data from Dutch elections and theoretical instances to study different procedures of coalition formation. The model shows that procedure plays an important role in reaching a coalition agreement and that political parties do not necessarily benefit from being a first-mover. Moreover, it is shown that a decrease in a party's flexibility can be (dis)advantageous in coalition negotiations. Furthermore, certain power sharing tactics appear not always to lead to an agreement that is in a party's advantage. The main message put forward is that the procedure of forming a coalition plays a more important role than is usually acknowledged in literature and practice.
|Date of creation:||May 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published, Group Decision and Negotiation, 2013, 22, 3, 407-427|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00666849|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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