Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility
In this paper, we analyze a spatial model of coalition formation with data from Dutch elections and with theoretical results. First, we study different procedures of coalition formation. The model shows that procedure plays an important role in reaching a coalition agreement and that political parties do not necessarily benefit from being a firstmover. Moreover, it is shown that a decrease in a party's flexibility can be beneficial in coalition negotiations. Furthermore, we find that certain power sharing tactics do not always lead to an agreement that is in a party's advantage. The main message put forward is that the process of coalition formation plays a more important role than is usually acknowledged in literature and practice.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Working paper GATE 2008-06. 2008|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00269093|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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