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Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System To Elect A Governing Board

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  • Brams, Steven J.

Abstract

I designed a voting system for a professional association to ensure the equitable representation of different interests on its governing board. Approval voting, whereby voters can vote for as many candidates as they approve of, is combined with constraints on the numbers that can be elected from different categories of members to find the set of candidates most approved of by all voters, subject to the constraints.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Brams, Steven J., 1990. "Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System To Elect A Governing Board," Working Papers 90-28, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:90-28
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    Cited by:

    1. Haris Aziz, 2019. "A Rule for Committee Selection with Soft Diversity Constraints," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(6), pages 1193-1200, December.
    2. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
    3. Steven J. Brams & Markus Brill & Anne-Marie George, 2022. "The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 283-300, February.
    4. Gianfranco Gambarelli, 1999. "Maximax Apportionments," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 8(6), pages 441-461, November.
    5. Egor Ianovski, 2022. "Electing a committee with dominance constraints," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 985-1000, November.
    6. Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gabon Gassi & Eric Kamwa, 2024. "On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules," Working Papers 2024-02, CRESE.
    7. Gabrielle Demange, 2013. "On Allocating Seats To Parties And Districts: Apportionments," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(03), pages 1-14.
    8. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Richard F. Potthoff, 2019. "Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 67-93, January.
    9. Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou, 2023. "Combining diversity and excellence in multi winner elections," Working Papers 2023-05, CRESE.
    10. Michel Regenwetter & Bernard Grofman, 1998. "Approval Voting, Borda Winners, and Condorcet Winners: Evidence from Seven Elections," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 520-533, April.
    11. Michael Ackerman & Sul-Young Choi & Peter Coughlin & Eric Gottlieb & Japheth Wood, 2013. "Elections with partially ordered preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 145-168, October.
    12. Richard F. Potthoff & Steven J. Brams, 1998. "Proportional Representation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 147-178, April.

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