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Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity

Author

Listed:
  • Brams, S.J.
  • Fishburn, P.C.

Abstract

This paper focuses on the fair division of a set of indivisible items between two people when both have the same linear preference order on the items but may have different preferences over subsets of items. Surprisingly, divisions that are envy-free, Pareto-optimal, and ensure that the less well-off person does as well as possible (i.e., are equitable) can often be achived. Preferences between subsets are assumed to satisfy axioms of qualitative probability without implying the existence of additive utilities, which is treated as a special case.

Suggested Citation

  • Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 1998. "Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity," Working Papers 98-20, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:98-20
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolò, Antonio & Yu, Yan, 2008. "Strategic divide and choose," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 268-289, September.
    2. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Christian Klamler, 2017. "Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 115-131, January.
    3. Gian Caspari, 2023. "A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 8(1), pages 75-96, December.
    4. Fragnelli, Vito & Marina, Maria Erminia, 2003. "A fair procedure in insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 75-85, August.
    5. Eve Ramaekers, 2013. "Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(2), pages 359-380, July.
    6. Steven J. Brams & Todd R. Kaplan, 2004. "Dividing the Indivisible," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(2), pages 143-173, April.
    7. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    8. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Christian Klamler, 2022. "Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 1-23, June.
    9. Brams, S. J. & Eldelman, P. H. & Fishburn, P. C., 2000. "Paradoxes of Fair Division," Working Papers 00-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    10. Laura Taylor & Mark Morrison & Kevin Boyle, 2010. "Exchange Rules and the Incentive Compatibility of Choice Experiments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(2), pages 197-220, October.
    11. Suksompong, Warut, 2018. "Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 40-47.
    12. Caspari, Gian, 2020. "Booster draft mechanism for multi-object assignment," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-074, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    13. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2014. "An algorithm for the proportional division of indivisible items," MPRA Paper 56587, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Rudolf Vetschera & D. Marc Kilgour, 2013. "Strategic Behavior in Contested-Pile Methods for Fair Division of Indivisible Items," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 299-319, March.
    15. RAMAEKERS, Eve, 2010. "Fair allocation of indivisible goods among two agents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2010087, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    16. Edelman, Paul & Fishburn, Peter, 2001. "Fair division of indivisible items among people with similar preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 327-347, May.
    17. Brams, Steven J. & Kaplan, Todd R., 2017. "Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 340, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    18. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & Christian Klamler, 2012. "The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 615-631, July.
    19. Haris Aziz, 2016. "A generalization of the AL method for fair allocation of indivisible objects," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(2), pages 307-324, October.
    20. Dall'Aglio, Marco & Mosca, Raffaele, 2007. "How to allocate hard candies fairly," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 218-237, December.
    21. Brams,S.L. & Kaplan,T.R., 2002. "Dividing the indivisible : procedures for allocating cabinet ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 340, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    22. Saralees Nadarajah, 2009. "The Pareto optimality distribution," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 43(6), pages 993-998, November.
    23. Steven J. Brams & Daniel L. King, 2005. "Efficient Fair Division," Rationality and Society, , vol. 17(4), pages 387-421, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    EQUITY ; OPTIMIZATION;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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