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Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity

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Author Info
Brams, S.J.
Fishburn, P.C.

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the fair division of a set of indivisible items between two people when both have the same linear preference order on the items but may have different preferences over subsets of items. Surprisingly, divisions that are envy-free, Pareto-optimal, and ensure that the less well-off person does as well as possible (i.e., are equitable) can often be achived. Preferences between subsets are assumed to satisfy axioms of qualitative probability without implying the existence of additive utilities, which is treated as a special case.

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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 98-20.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:98-20

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 269 Mercer Street 7th Floor, New York, NY 10003
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Related research
Keywords: EQUITY OPTIMIZATION

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

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