We consider the classic cake-divison problem when the cake is a heterogeneous good represented by an interval in the real line. We provide a mechanism to implement, in an anonymous way, an envy-free and efficient allocation when agents have private information on their preferences. The mechanism is a multistep sequential game form in which each agent at each step receives a morsel of the cake that is the intersection of what she asks for herself and what the other agent concedes to her.
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Paper provided by Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno" in its series "Marco Fanno" Working Papers with number
0022.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
William Thomson, 2004.
"Divide-and-Permute,"
RCER Working Papers
510, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Brams, S. J. & Eldelman, P. H. & Fishburn, P. C., 2000.
"Fair Division of Indivisible Items,"
Working Papers
00-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]