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Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma

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  • Steven J. Brams

    (Department of Politics, New York University)

Abstract

The relationship between Newcomb's problem, which involves an apparent paradox of prediction, and Prisoners' Dilemma is explicated. After describing a resolution to Newcomb's problem, due to John A. Ferejohn, that renders the two contradictory principles of choice in Newcomb's problem (dominance and expected utility) consistent, I show Prisoners' Dilemma to be a “symmetricized†version of Newcomb's problem in its payoff structure. The assumption about predictability of choice made for one player in Newcomb's problem, when applied to both players in Prisoners' Dilemma–one considered as a leader and the other as a follower–offers a resolution to this dilemma that, while consistent with the resolution offered by metagame theory, rationalizes the existence of a metagame solution within a probabilistic, rational-choice framework. The relevance of the mutual-predictability assumption to the solution of arms races, and tragedy-of-commons situations generally, is discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven J. Brams, 1975. "Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 19(4), pages 596-612, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:19:y:1975:i:4:p:596-612
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277501900402
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas A. Weber, 2016. "A robust resolution of Newcomb’s paradox," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 339-356, September.
    2. S. Plous, 1985. "Perceptual Illusions and Military Realities," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(3), pages 363-389, September.
    3. Max Albert & Ronald A. Heiner, 2003. "An Indirect-Evolution Approad to Newcomb's Problem," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 20, pages 161-194.
    4. Jeffrey Goldberg & Lívia Markoczy & G. Lawrence Zahn, 2005. "Symmetry and the Illusion of Control as Bases for Cooperative Behavior," Rationality and Society, , vol. 17(2), pages 243-270, May.
    5. Steven J. Brams, 1977. "Deception in 2 × 2 Games," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 2(2), pages 171-203, February.
    6. Jeffrey T. Richelson, 1979. "Multiple Aim Point Basing," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(4), pages 613-628, December.
    7. Babajanyan, S.G. & Melkikh, A.V. & Allahverdyan, A.E., 2020. "Leadership scenarios in prisoner’s dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 545(C).
    8. Robert Axelrod, 1980. "Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(1), pages 3-25, March.
    9. Robert Lapson, 1993. "Cooperation by Indirect Revelation Through Strategic Behavior," Discussion Papers 1036, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. L^e Nguy^en Hoang, 2020. "Purely Bayesian counterfactuals versus Newcomb's paradox," Papers 2008.04256, arXiv.org.
    11. Brams, Steven & Kilgour, Marc, 2017. "Stabilizing unstable outcomes in prediction games," MPRA Paper 77655, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Stan A. Kaplowitz, 1977. "The Influence of Moral Considerations on the Perceived Consequences of an Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(3), pages 475-500, September.

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