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A Characterization of Plurality-Like Rules Based on Non-Manipulability, Restricted Efficiency, and Anonymity

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  • Biung-Ghi Ju

    (Department of Economics, The University of Kansas)

Abstract

A society needs to decide which issues (laws, public projects, public facilities, etc.) in an agenda to accept. The decision can be any subset of the agenda but must reflect the preferences of its members, which are assumed to be ¡°separable weak orderings¡±. We characterize a family of ¡°plurality-like¡± rules based on strategy-proofness, restricted efficiency, anonymity, and two weak axioms pertaining to the variable agenda feature of our model, called dummy independence and division indifference. We also characterize a wide spectrum of rules dropping anonymity or restricted efficiency.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Kansas, Department of Economics in its series WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS with number 200509.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision: Mar 2005
Publication status: Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory
Handle: RePEc:kan:wpaper:200509

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Keywords: Plurality; Strategy-proofness; Efficiency; Restricted efficiency; Anonymity; Division indifference; Separable preferences;

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References

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  1. Dov Samet & David Schmeidler, 1999. "Between Liberalism and Democracy," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9908001, EconWPA.
  2. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 469-499, December.
  3. Michel Le Breton & Arunava Sen, 1999. "Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 605-628, May.
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  8. Guha, Ashok, 1972. "Neutrality, Monotonicity, and the Right of Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 40(5), pages 821-26, September.
  9. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 115-128, 07.
  10. Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October.
  11. Plott, Charles R & Levine, Michael E, 1978. "A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 68(1), pages 146-60, March.
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  13. William Thomson, 2001. "On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 327-386.
  14. Le Breton, M. & Sen, A., 1995. "Strategyproofness and decomposability : Weak Orderings," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III 95a38, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  15. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 1999. "Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 47-85, August.
  16. Ken-Ichi Shimomura, 1996. "Partially efficient voting by committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 327-342.
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Cited by:
  1. Pritchard, Geoffrey & Wilson, Mark C., 2009. "Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 35-57, July.

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