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Voting by Committees under Constraints

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  • Salvador Barberà
  • Jordi Massó
  • Alejandro Neme

Abstract

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 7.

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Date of creation: Feb 2001
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Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:7

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Keywords: voting; strategy-proofness; additive and separable preferences;

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References

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  1. Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Neme, A., 1992. "Voting Under Constraints," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 200.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. ASWAL, Navin & CHATTERJI, Shurojit & SEN, Arunava, 1999. "Dictatorial domains," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1999040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Masso, J. & Barbera, S., 1996. "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists) 156, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
  4. Barbera, S. & Gul, F. & Stacchetti, E., 1992. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 184.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2009. "Tops-Only Domains," Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics 06-2009, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  2. Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda, 2010. "On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-peakedness," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 809.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Debasis Mishra & Souvik Roy, 2011. "Strategy-proof partitioning," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India 11-06, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  4. Klamler, Christian & Pferschy, Ulrich & Ruzika, Stefan, 2012. "Committee selection under weight constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 48-56.
  5. Reffgen, Alexander & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  6. Chatterji, Shurojit & Roy, Souvik & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 353-366.

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