IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v146y2016icp39-41.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population

Author

Listed:
  • Kelly, Jerry S.
  • Qi, Shaofang

Abstract

Plurality rule on a fixed population is characterized by anonymity, neutrality, tops-only and a monotonicity property.

Suggested Citation

  • Kelly, Jerry S. & Qi, Shaofang, 2016. "Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 39-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:146:y:2016:i:c:p:39-41
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516302464
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 335-354, September.
    2. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(1), pages 115-128, July.
    3. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2016. "A Strategy-Proofness Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(4), pages 610-623, August.
    4. Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October.
    5. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    6. Roberts, Fred S., 1991. "Characterizations of the plurality function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 101-127, April.
    7. M. Sanver, 2009. "Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(3), pages 461-471, June.
    8. Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2008. "An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(3), pages 575-583, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Salvador Barberà & Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2021. "Daunou’s voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 259-289, February.
    2. Z. Emel Öztürk, 2020. "Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 801-831, September.
    3. Hiroki Saitoh, 2022. "Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 139-173, July.
    4. Ozkes, Ali I. & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2023. "Uniform random dictatorship: A characterization without strategy-proofness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
    5. Barberà, Salvador & Bossert, Walter, 2023. "Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fasil Alemante & Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2016. "Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(4), pages 765-783, October.
    2. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
    3. Sato, Shin, 2016. "Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: A characterization of the plurality with a runoff," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 11-19.
    4. Hiroki Saitoh, 2022. "Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 139-173, July.
    5. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2014. "Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 69-78.
    6. Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Variable-population voting rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 210-221.
    7. Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2017. "The greatest unhappiness of the least number," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(3), pages 637-655, December.
    8. Z. Emel Ozturk, 2017. "A composition-consistency characterization of the plurality rule," Working Papers 2017_04, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    9. Sato, Shin, 2009. "Informational requirements of social choice rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 188-198, March.
    10. Z. Emel Öztürk, 2020. "Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 801-831, September.
    11. Sekiguchi, Yohei, 2012. "A characterization of the plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 330-332.
    12. Eliora Hout & Harrie Swart & Annemarie Veer, 2006. "Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 459-475, December.
    13. Yohei Sekiguchi, 2012. "A Characterization of the Plurality Rule," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-833, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    14. Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2014. "A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 153-168, February.
    15. Brandl, Florian & Peters, Dominik, 2022. "Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    16. McMorris, F.R. & Mulder, Henry Martyn & Novick, Beth & Powers, Robert C., 2021. "Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 164-174.
    17. Andrei Gomberg, 2011. "Vote Revelation: Empirical Characterization of Scoring Rules," Working Papers 1102, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    18. Salvador Barberà & Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2021. "Daunou’s voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 259-289, February.
    19. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 335-354, September.
    20. Robert E. Goodin & Christian List, 2004. "Unique Virtues of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem," Public Economics 0409010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Dec 2005.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social choice correspondence; Plurality; Anonymity; Neutrality; Tops-only; Monotonicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:146:y:2016:i:c:p:39-41. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.