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Daunou’s Voting Rule and the Lexicographic Assignment of Priorities

Author

Listed:
  • Salvador Barberà
  • Walter Bossert
  • Kotaro Suzumura

Abstract

Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining candidates. We characterize his rule which combines potentially conflicting desiderata of majoritarianism by ordering them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to promote a promising general approach to reconcile potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvador Barberà & Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2019. "Daunou’s Voting Rule and the Lexicographic Assignment of Priorities," Working Papers 1107, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Barberà, Salvador & Bossert, Walter, 2023. "Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    2. Salvador Barberà & Walter Bossert, 2023. "Intermediate Condorcet Winners and Losers," Working Papers 1380, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Elise S. Brezis, 2023. "Regulating the Revolving Door of Regulators," Working Papers 2023-03, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    4. Barberà, Salvador & Bossert, Walter & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2023. "Wine rankings and the Borda method," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 122-138, May.
    5. Shmuel I. Nitzan & Asaf D.M. Nitzan, 2023. "Balancing Democracy: Majoritarianism vs. Expression of Preference Intensity," Working Papers 2023-02, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    6. Amartya Sen, 2020. "Majority decision and Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 211-217, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting rules; Daunou's method; Condorcet criterion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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