Making Statements and Approval Voting
AbstractWe assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 237.
Date of creation: Jul 2005
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Weiss, 2005. "Making Statements and Approval Voting," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1531, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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- Lohmann, Susanne, 1994. "Information Aggregation through Costly Political Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 518-30, June.
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- Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 2003.
"Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting,"
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
03-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
- Miguel Angel Ballester & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2007. "Sincere Voting with Cardinal Preferences: Approval Voting," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (UAB) and Institut d'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (CSIC) 675.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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