Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 91 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
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- Maskin, Eric, 1999.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
- Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
- Yi, Jianxin, 2005. "A complete characterization of majority rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 109-112, April.
- J. Woeginger, Gerhard, 2003. "A new characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 89-94, October.
- Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 2000. "A simple characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 689-700.
- M. Sanver, 2009. "Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 159-171, June.
- Houy, Nicolas, 2007. "A characterization for qualified majority voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 17-24, July.
- Bonifacio Llamazares, 2013. "On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 239-248, September.
- Powers, R.C., 2010. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules and partial anonymity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 12-14, January.
- Can, Burak & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2009. "Stereotype formation as trait aggregation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 226-237, September.
- Nicolas Houy, 2007. "A new characterization of absolute qualified majority voting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(4), pages 1-8.
- Susumu Cato, 2011. "Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 503-518, October.
- Núñez Matias & Valleta Giacomo, 2012.
"The informational simplicity of scoring rules,"
011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Perry, Jonathan & Powers, Robert C., 2010. "Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 57-60, July.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2010. "Strategy-proofness and weighted voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 15-23, July.
- Susumu Cato & Daisuke Hirata, 2010. "Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 611-630, April.
- Perry, Jonathan & Powers, Robert C., 2008. "Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 108-110, July.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:4:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
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