A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice
AbstractWe use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May's Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on the robustness of Majority Rule due to Maskin (1995). In each case, geometry provides new insights on the working and interplay of the axioms, and suggests new results including a new characterization of the entire class of Majority Rule SWFs, a strengthening of May's Theorem, and a new version of Maskin's Theorem.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/9007.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (2002) v.19 n° 3,p.587-611
Other versions of this item:
- Estelle Cantillon & Antonio Rangel, 2002. "A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 587-611.
- Estelle Cantillon & Antonio Rangel, 2000. "A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1285, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Estelle Cantillon, 2001. "A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice," NBER Technical Working Papers 0268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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