Conundrums for Nonconsequentialists
AbstractThere are a number of single-profile impossibility theorems in social choice theory and welfare economics that demonstrate the incompatibility of dominance criteria with various nonconsequentialist principles given some rationality restrictions on the rankings being considered. This article is concerned with examining what they have in common and how they differ. Groups of results are identified that have similar formal structures and are established using similar proof strategies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 13-00010.
Date of creation: 26 Jun 2013
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consequentialism; welfarism; social choice; welfare economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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